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Introduction: Those in mental health-related consumer movements have made clear their demands for humane
treatment and basic civil rights, an end to stigma and discrimination, and a chance to participate in their own
recovery. But theorizing about the politics of recognition, ‘recognition rights’ and epistemic justice, suggests that
they also have a stake in the broad cultural meanings associated with conceptions of mental health and illness.
Results: First person accounts of psychiatric diagnosis and mental health care (shown here to represent ‘counter
stories’ to the powerful ‘master narrative’ of biomedical psychiatry), offer indications about how experiences of
mental disorder might be reframed and redefined as part of efforts to acknowledge and honor recognition rights
and epistemic justice. However, the task of cultural semantics is one for the entire culture, not merely consumers.
These new meanings must be negotiated. When they are not the result of negotiation, group-wrought definitions
risk imposing a revision no less constraining than the mis-recognizing one it aims to replace. Contested realities
make this a challenging task when it comes to cultural meanings about mental disorder. Examples from mental
illness memoirs about two contested realities related to psychosis are examined here: the meaninglessness of
symptoms, and the role of insight into illness. They show the magnitude of the challenge involved - for
consumers, practitioners, and the general public - in the reconstruction of these new meanings and realities.
Conclusion: To honor recognition rights and epistemic justice acknowledgement must be made of the
heterogeneity of the effects of, and of responses to, psychiatric diagnosis and care, and the extent of the challenge
of the reconstructive cultural semantics involved.
Introduction
Those in mental health-related consumer movements
have made many of their demands clear, including the
demand for humane treatment and basic civil rights, an
end to stigma and discrimination, and a chance to parti-
cipate in their own recovery. But theorizing about iden-
tity politics and the politics of recognition suggests that
they also have a stake in something else: the way they
and their conditions are to be depicted in the broadest
terms. In the following, I want to sketch some of the
real world imperatives that are implied in this sugges-
tion, employing the work of political philosopher Nancy
Fraser and appealing to first person narratives about the
experience of mental disorder as source material. This is
not primarily a theoretical discussion, but rather one
that attempts to apply theory to a pressing social and
political phenomenon. The first part of this discussion
explains why some demands of those who receive, or
have received, mental health care can be seen as
demands for recognition rights, and describes the task
of reconstructive cultural semantics apparently called if
we honor the recognition rights of mental health care
consumers. Some challenges implicit in that task are
introduced (see Results). First person accounts of mental
disorder expose conceptions of insight and meaning at
odds with the precepts and assumptions to be found in
the ‘master narrative’ of medical psychiatry. In light of
these contested realities, it is argued that the reconstruc-
tive task will involve negotiation over the contested
meanings involved.
Mental health consumers’ movements
The broad details about mental health consumers’
movements are familiar to us. Modeled on other consu-
mer and liberation movements, these political interest
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communities are variously self-identified as “service
users,” “survivors,” “consumers,” “mad pride,” and
“recovery” groups. Their efforts to achieve basic civil
rights, noted above, have taken a range of forms and
met with uneven, but promising, success. (In what fol-
lows, the term “mental health care consumers” refers to
members of these groups, whose commonality is receiv-
ing or having received mental health care.) One aspect
of those movements is emphasized in this discussion:
they have fostered, and drawn attention to, an old, but
today burgeoning, literary genre - published memoirs as
well as less formal descriptions recounting the experi-
ence of mental disorder from the perspective of the first
person. These accounts, I will argue, represent an
important starting point in the quest for recognition;
moreover, they help us understand some of the chal-
lenges involved in a proper recognition of those who
have received psychiatric diagnoses.
Redistributive and recognition paradigms
Important theorizing around what is known as identity
and recognition politics has come from political philoso-
phy in recent decades. (See, for example, [1-3].) Influ-
enced by German critical theorists working in a
Hegelian tradition, such as Habermas, Nancy Fraser
identifies two distinct and irreducible paradigms of jus-
tice [4]. The first is the familiar redistributive paradigm
associated with economic justice. As well though, Fraser
identifies a “recognition” paradigm. This latter paradigm
requires the elimination of cultural injustices rooted in
cultural patterns of representation, communication and
interpretation. To expunge culturally constructed identi-
ties that the people to whom they are attributed want to
reject, Fraser advocates that “some sort of cultural or
symbolic” change must take place. In additional to the
social and economic change dealt with in the redistribu-
tive paradigm, this cultural or symbolic change will be
seen as a remedy for cultural, as distinct from merely
economic, injustice. (See [4] page 15.)
The particular groups which Fraser uses as her exam-
ples in this discussion are those based on class, gender,
race, and “despised sexualities.” But with its emphasis
on a liberty right to group identity recognition, Fraser’s
appeal to a recognition paradigm can be seen as an
expression of identity politics, which is far from limited
to those particular categories (class, gender, race,
despised sexualities). It is a template for any of the
groups participating in the identity politics of today
(battered women, the adult children of incest perpetra-
tors, and those with physical disabilities, for example).
In addition, and my particular concern here, it may have
application to the consumers of mental health services.
Recognition is a normative status, demanded by jus-
tice, and sensitive to variations among those for whom
it is sought. Remedies for disadvantaged and margina-
lized groups will reflect the differences between such
groups, including the respective injustices to which they
have been subject. Thus the systematic misrepresenta-
tion suffered by people with psychiatric diagnoses will
require a more thoroughgoing and fundamental remedy
than will the lack of recognition suffered by some other
marginalized groups. In fact, it is not a failure of recog-
nition as such, that the mentally ill have been prey to, it
is almost the reverse - they have been all too conspicu-
ous. What they have suffered has been a notably sys-
tematic and damaging mis-recognition. Mental disorder
has been allied with otherness, with irrationality, lack of
competence, deficient agency, identity and even human-
ity. Its sufferers have also been the victims of what has
been described as epistemic injustice - deprived of
semantic authority and credibility (See [5]).
Fraser is sparing in her account of what forms the cul-
tural and symbolic change that she advocates might
take, and we must extrapolate to the particular case of
the group identity of the consumers of mental health
care. In Fraser’s analysis, acknowledgement of the recog-
nition paradigm will proceed in two stages. A remedy
for the cultural injustice, or mis-recognition, visited
upon some group would involve, in her terms, a self-
generated, symbolic redefinition of their group identity.
And the second stage: this redefinition would be so
powerful as to eventually eliminate generalities about
such group identity and allegiances. The goal of the
recognition paradigm remedy would be to “put the
group out of business as a group,” in her words (See [4]
page 19).
The applicability of the first of these steps to mental
health consumers is the one I want to consider here.
Assimilationist assumptions of the kind on which the
second goal rests have been challenged even in relation
to the groups based on class, gender, race and despised
sexualities Fraser names. And as they have identified
themselves thus far, mental health consumers do not
speak with one voice over whether their ultimate goals
are to eliminate and de-emphasize their commonalities
until assimilation is achieved, or to emphasize and valor-
ize them.
Fraser rightly places the two paradigms, the one eco-
nomic and the other cultural and symbolic, on an equal
footing. And injustices associated with the first, eco-
nomic paradigm will be equally applicable to the consu-
mers of mental health care. Economic deprivations
resulting from stigma over mental illness - widely
acknowledged - include access to mental health care,
and housing, employment and other forms of discrimi-
nation with economic implications. Undeniably, the
redistributive paradigm calls for equal attention and
acknowledgement, but because it has already been at
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the forefront of these movements’ demands, that para-
digm can also be set aside here.
In more recent writing, Fraser has noted some of the
dangers of equating the politics of recognition with
identity politics, and we’ll turn to those concerns at the
end of this discussion. But it is with the group identity
of mental health care consumers in relation to recogni-
tion that I want to begin.
The right to recognition for mental health care
consumers
If we think about the collective identity of consumers of
mental health care in light of Fraser’s recognition para-
digm, several things emerge. (1) If there is a right to
recognition of this kind, then as part of such a right
those making up these movements have an interest in
the manner in which their experiences and lives are
represented. Due to the degree of stigma and discrimi-
nation associated with cultural patterns of representa-
tion, communication and interpretation about mental
disorder in particular, that interest seems likely to be a
compelling one, and quite as important to consumers as
their interest in achieving the more usual liberty rights
they have demanded. Moreover (2) this must be, as Fra-
ser puts it, a self generated effort. It is one that, in the
spirit of the consumer movement slogan “Nothing about
us without us,” and the model of other liberation move-
ments, calls for group member participation [6]. Consu-
mers must themselves take part in the symbolic
redefinition of their group identity.
Efforts at symbolic redefinition associated with identity
politics take diverse forms. In the simplest cases, redefi-
nition involves name change (from American Indian to
Native American, from Disabled to Differently Abled,
from Victim to Survivor, for example). The shift from
“Mentally Ill” to “Survivor” and “Recovering” has to
some extent been the kind of group-generated response
Fraser envisions. There cannot be found a unified pur-
pose in these all these name changes, however, as the
shift proposed by some from “Mentally Ill” to “Mad
Pride”, makes particularly clear. The differing connota-
tions of “survivor” (with its implicit critique of the care
received); “consumer” and “service user” (stressing com-
monalities with other recipients of goods and services);
and “mad pride,” with its impulse to rehabilitate and
valorize, reflect profoundly different attitudes. But what-
ever it conveys, a mere name change - even if agreed
upon, and even if necessary - must prove insufficient
here, in light of the historically entrenched and perva-
sive stigma and discrimination associated with cultural
patterns of representation, communication and interpre-
tation about mental disorder, and the previous voiceless-
ness of its sufferers in public discourse.
So the larger challenge calls for re-conceptualizing all
aspects of the way mental disorder is construed, not
merely the terms used to refer to it. Moreover, this chal-
lenge demands redefinition that goes beyond the merely
personal. Not only individuals’ autobiographical stories,
their symptoms, their conception of their own disorder
and the treatment received in relation their own lives,
although these are all important, but broader concep-
tions of mental health, illness, rationality, responsibility
and competence must all be subject to re-envisioning in
this effort. The additional political goal involves what
might be called reconstructive cultural semantics: a revi-
sion which consumers undertake - if not alone, then as
central, and privileged, participants. - of these most gen-
eral ideas about sanity and madness.
The scope and challenge of this cultural project can
hardly be overestimated. First, much is implicated in a
reconstruction of cultural ideas about mental health and
illness, because the beliefs, metaphors, assumptions, and
presuppositions affecting patterns of representation,
communication, and interpretation about this kind of
disorder are entwined with categories and concepts fun-
damental to our cultural norms and values: rationality,
mind and character, self-control, competence, responsi-
bility and personhood. The position of epistemic disad-
vantage from which the central participants in this
project (the consumers) must proceed, is an additional
aspect of the challenge it presents. The mad have been
excluded from the epistemic as well as the social com-
munity, their voices disregarded and dismissed as mean-
ingless. Their struggle must include being believed as
credible knowers, as well as merely being heard. And
finally, as we shall see, there are seemingly incompatible
perspectives and contested realities involved. Being
heard at all, and being accorded the status of credible,
are the demands made by many marginalized groups.
But in addition to surmounting these obstacles, consu-
mers of mental health care will need to negotiate the
controversial ideas and contrary perspectives they bring
to more mainstream and widely accepted
understandings.
Results
Reconstructive cultural semantics: action steps
First person accounts of experience with mental illness,
mental health care and psychiatric diagnosis provide a
valuable source material, and a remarkable and apposite
guide in the effort to begin this broader project of rede-
finition. Such “madness narratives” range from full
memoirs to briefer first person accounts and comments,
and they have in recent years come to be recognized as
constituting a distinctive literary genre, deserving of cri-
tical attention. In English alone even published works
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have been assessed to number in the hundreds, and
countless others, it has been observed, “lie half-written
in desk drawers, or unacknowledged in physicians’ pub-
lications and case notes.” ([7] See page 01). There have
always been such memoirs, almost since we have auto-
biographical records of any kind. The Booke of Margery
Kemp, for example, dictated by an illiterate woman sub-
ject to recurrent episodes of distressing disorder, dates
to late medieval times. Today has brought a burgeoning
increase in such documents, as well as some critical lit-
erary attention (See [8,9]). Only consumers themselves
can provide testimony and bear witness in this way.
However sympathetic and knowledgeable they might be,
non-consumers are differently positioned, with obliga-
tions lying elsewhere. As allies, non-consumers must
acknowledge, honor and attend to these first person
narratives of survival, recovery, and experience with dis-
order, psychiatric diagnosis, and mental health care, and
remain open to the potential cultural transformation
they can bring; they must confer credibility on consu-
mers as knowledge claimants. In addition, as we shall
see presently, non-consumers and particularly mental
health caregivers may need to participate in a negotia-
tion over the contested realities that are revealed by
some of this writing.
First person accounts of mental disorder have often
taken the form of resistance writing, it has been
observed, once created despite and in opposition to the
powerful forces of the asylum in which their authors
have been involuntary and reluctant inmates, and of the
societal and medical systems that have placed them
there. (They have for this reason been analogized to
slave narratives [7].) Even in today’s era of deinstitutio-
nalization and more effective treatments moreover,
these memoirs remain highly transgressive documents,
with wide-ranging political implications. One focus of
the more contemporary memoirs introduced here is
their relation to the medical “master narrative” within
which they are regularly - yet not entirely or unambigu-
ously - framed. This is a critical aspect of mental health
memoirs because of the power of the medical psychia-
tric structures and institutions within which diagnosis
and treatment usually occur today. These documents
hold other interest and value as well. However, their
relation to medical framing exemplifies the depth and
pervasiveness of attitudes at the heart of the re-framing
and re-definition challenges involved in any task of
reconstructive cultural semantics, and they will be our
focus here. First person accounts of the experience of
mental disorder are invaluable in helping us understand
its effects on the personal lives of its sufferers. But its
medical framing, in which mental disorder is depicted as
an objective biological and behavioral phenomenon, pro-
vides a more general, public, and purportedly objective
analysis, and a thoroughgoing reconstruction must
address cultural meanings at this level of generality,
publicity, and purported objectivity.
The medical narrative as “master narrative”
Memoirs from our era regularly introduce reductionistic
assumptions from modern biological psychiatry. Mental
aberration is pathology, or dysfunction, and psychiatric
symptoms are the meaningless causal products of a dis-
ordered brain, best expunged by medical science. Such
medical framing demands attention for two reasons, its
prevalence, and its compelling narrative force.
The same sort of framing that is found in memoirs of
psychiatric diagnosis and disorder governs accounts of
bodily illness and disability, of course. And in order to
grasp the ubiquity and power of the medical “master
narrative,” we can begin with first person accounts of
more ordinary disease and disability. Analyzing his per-
sonal experience with heart disease and cancer, Arthur
Frank writes of the way medical discourse dictates the
terms and reality in which all illness and disability mem-
oirs are cast. A cost of the “sick role,” he asserts, is
nothing less than a “narrative surrender” [10]. Telling it
medically, Frank suggests, is taken as telling it “how it
is.” Medical language and presuppositions function to
rob alternative framings of rhetorical vitality and even
intelligibility.
Conditions like heart disease and cancer for the most
part leave the patient still possessed of mental faculties
and the communicative and other capabilities we associ-
ate with personhood, and yet this curb on narrative
vitality and intelligibility is experienced and is, if Frank
is right, next to unavoidable. So much more should we
expect the sort of narrative “surrender” he describes
when the patient’s very disorder is understood to jeopar-
dize capabilities at the center of conceptions of person-
hood and justify a failure to confer credibility to its
sufferers. And medical framing, we shall see, pervades
psychiatric memoirs through and through.
Attitudes towards medical framing are another feature
shared by psychiatric memoirs and the narratives that
describe bodily disease and disability. Authors of both
kinds of writing chafe at, and attempt to resist, that
framing, as Frank did. This resistance has been depicted
as a struggle against what those discussing disability
writing have sometimes called “master narratives,” that
is, “repositories of common norms” which “exercise ...
authority over our moral imaginations"([11] page 8).
Master narratives are an expression of the power of a
dominant group; it is a power so great as to create con-
ditions for non-recognition or mis-recognition of mar-
ginalized groups such as, in our case, those bearing
psychiatric diagnoses. And those who identify master
narratives offer a prescription: illness and disability
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memoirs ought to provide “counter -stories” to unseat
the prevailing master narratives and weaken their
power. Counter-stories have been described as those
that resist an oppressive identity and attempt to replace
it with one that commands respect; they challenge
unjust assumptions implicit in the master narrative and
identify their subjects “more accurately and fairly” as the
result (See [11] page 6.)
If we look at the history of medicine, we can see that
medical framing about mental disorder itself once con-
stituted a counter-story. At the beginning of the modern
era, it would have been told in defiance of a master nar-
rative depicting such disorder as divine punishment, or
demonic possession. An example of this is John Perce-
val’s 1840 Narrative on the Treatment Experienced by a
Gentleman during a State of Mental Derangement [12].
Likening the mind to “an excellent piece of machinery”
he repudiates the religious and moralistic interpretations
of his disorder that were the orthodoxy of his day. In
today’s writing, however, the medical framing represents
a master narrative. Psychiatric memoirs - due both to
the fact that they are there at all, and to the way they
are able to acknowledge yet resist and challenge medical
discourse, can be seen as “counter-stories.”
Reading between the lines: counter stories about insight
and meaning
Some acknowledgement of the medical understanding
with which their care givers approach their condition
seems almost inescapable in these memoirs. Imaginative
flexibility and rhetorical impact must be affected
because of the ubiquity, authority, and influence of the
master narrative of medical psychiatry. The vitality and
coherence of psychiatric memoirs cannot but be con-
strained by these powerful psychiatric paradigms. They
deflate the very purpose of such writing. If ideas are
delusional, perceptions are mistaken, feelings are
deemed unmoored, imaginary, or inappropriate, beha-
vioral responses are the meaningless output of a disor-
dered brain, what value can such first person accounts
be accorded? When written in the throes of active epi-
sodes of disorder, they are further symptoms, or harm-
less ways to fill the time until reason returns -
occupational therapy on the cheap. When constructed
after the fact, they are understood as meaningless irrup-
tions in the flow of a comprehensible life “narrative,”
better forgotten. Within the master narrative, psychotic
episodes are at most opportunity costs in a more func-
tional life trajectory, and are no more meaningful than a
bad dream. This includes, but goes beyond the usual
epistemic injustices inflicted on members of margina-
lized groups by the broader society. Moreover, it reflects
sources of power that are augmented through institutio-
nalized expertise and authority.
That said, total narrative surrender such as Arthur
Frank speaks of, is rare in these memoirs. Occasionally,
they also fail to find meaning or value in the experiences
and symptoms they record. But this is unusual. Much
more commonly, while constrained by medical psychia-
tric framing, these narratives reveal their authors’ chaf-
ing at, and challenging, its limitations. Often however,
we must look between the lines to find the counter-
stories.
The ways today’s memoirists acknowledge the influ-
ence of these biomedical presuppositions are various.
They are told in a range of tones, for example - the
indignant, the resigned, the sardonic and satirical; they
are in varying degrees accepted, or railed against; they
are deemed to be incomplete explanations - and also
explanatorily irrelevant, and beside the point. Rarely, in
all the variation is it accepted that medical presupposi-
tions offer the only accurate, exhaustive and useful
perspective from which to understand and explain the
experience of disorder, however. Instead, we find
observations like the following, written by a woman
treated for schizophrenia. “Scientific drug therapy and
a life of faith” she explains, “...have worked together in
my recovery...Along with taking this medication I have
sought help from my religion...It is a combination of
resperidone and religious practice that gives me clear
thinking” ([13] page 543.) Room is made in this
account for the effects of biological psychiatry, but the
author emphasizes that the resperidone was only one
of several factors responsible for her improvement. In
another passage, the same author attributes meaning
and significance to her psychotic symptoms. “Once
during a storm, the rain was falling in a heavy down-
pour, and the sound of it falling became a voice. It
said “Believe in Jesus Christ and you will be saved.
This message within the rainfall and the call to faith it
invoked have been important factors in my recovery. A
dramatic improvement in my mental health has
resulted from this message. In general, the psychiatric
community has been reluctant to acknowledge any-
thing of value in psychotic phenomena, but I know in
an experiential way that meaning can sometimes be
found in them” (See [13] page 546.)
The notion that “reluctance to acknowledge anything
of value in psychotic phenomena” is belied by the
patient’s own experiences, finds its way in these accounts
again and again. Here is another: “I don’t believe that
the voices and hallucinations from which I’ve suffered in
my life have merely been the result of a ‘biochemical
imbalance,’ but have reflected a need from deep within
myself to find myself” ([14] page 148.) Rather than the
meaningless byproducts of a disordered brain, psychia-
tric symptoms are here depicted as meaningful elements
of experience and identity.
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In addition, patient accounts often reveal “meaning
making” that, while idiosyncratic, is nonetheless of the
utmost personal significance to the patients themselves,
their conceptions of their lives, and even, perhaps, the
course of their condition. Describing her experience of a
brain scan one woman, who had been hospitalized for
many years with psychosis, spoke of her (seemingly unli-
kely) change in appearance since the scan, and other
changes as well:
Yes I have [changed]. My soul is red now. It used to
be black. Everything is easier now. I can breathe. I can’t
explain it, but I feel happy. I’m satisfied with myself...I’m
burning with a love for life. I accept life now."([15] page
198.)
Arguably, the “meaning” this woman finds in her
experience is so idiosyncratic, and lacking in intersubjec-
tive coherence as to be, in one sense, meaningless
(despite its proper grammar). Yet whatever its lack of
“objective” or intersubjective meaning, or its relative
importance, her experience of the brain scan possesses
associations and connotations of strong significance to
her. In this respect, at least, it cannot be dismissed as
the undesirable, dispensable state, ideally expunged, that
seems to be presupposed by much contemporary medi-
cal understanding of such symptoms. Meaningfulness
and even intelligibility, this writing seems to indicate,
rest on more than mere inter-subjective agreement. And
even an idiosyncratic meaning system - what has some-
times been dismissed as a merely private “language” and
thus no language at all - can still have intra-personal
effects. Too little is yet understood about healing in psy-
chiatry for us to dismiss out of hand that this patient’s
ideas might serve to ameliorate her condition. (Reports
from the Hearing Voices Network seem to provide
some confirmation of this general claim. Surveys showed
that strategies of actively engaging with inner voices - by
asking what lessons these messages brought, for exam-
ple, served their hearers better than ignoring them [16].)
Like narratives that emphasize there are different expla-
nations of psychotic symptoms, this passage suggests
what recent findings in anthropology confirm: that such
symptoms may be meaningful in more than one way
[17,18].
To the rhetorical force of the master story that serves
to rob any counter-stories of narrative vitality, must be
added another reason why we often have to read
between the lines here. Clinical lore designates lack of
medical insight an indication of illness.
Sometimes absence of insight is presented as itself a
symptom of the severe disorder it so frequently accom-
panies. It has been aligned, for instance, to the delu-
sional syndrome that afflicts those unable to recognize
neurologically-wrought deficits such as blindness and
paralyses. If not itself a symptom, lack of insight is at
the least portrayed as a clinical criterion of severe disor-
der. The patient’s psychosis is indicated by a failure to
adopt what has been seen as an accurate acknowledge-
ment that mental disorder is present. In his classic state-
ment, Aubrey Lewis defined insight as “the correct
attitude to morbid change in oneself, and moreover, the
realization that the illness is mental “ (cited in [19] page
496.)(This is not a position limited to the medical per-
spective, it should be added: in twelve step programs,
failure to acknowledge one’s status as an alcoholic, for
example, is regarded as confirmation of that status.)
Recent work on insight has emphasized that failure of
insight is not an all or nothing state. Moreover, there is
some variation over the particular set of beliefs compris-
ing the “lack of insight” taken to be so central to heal-
ing. Unawareness that anything is wrong, and that what
is wrong indicates illness or disorder, for example, can
each be distinguished from incorrect “ attributions” or
explanations of the causes of the illness [20].
Because an acknowledgement of one’s symptoms as
illness is used as a measure of health or healing, an
ostensibly medical framing has immense value for the
narrator. If lack of insight is a clinical indicator of disor-
der, then only through acknowledging the presence of
illness, can we appear to be well. And this point, with
all its irony, is rarely lost on the authors of these
accounts. Thus, the part played by insight, it is also fre-
quently implied, constitutes a snare. It seems to ensure
a dismissive attitude towards the meaning of symptoms
that is belied by the patient’s own experiences - yet it
has untold pragmatic benefits.
Two implications of the clinical role of insight into ill-
ness are worth noting here. First, to the extent that it
represents a strategic effort to appear well, a medical
“spin” might be expected to distort and obscure much
of what makes these accounts valuable as descriptions
of the experiences themselves. Reading between the
lines may be not only desirable, but dictated by the
quest for accuracy.
And second: the use of insight into illness as a criter-
ion of healing and health is not merely a clinician’s
power trip, although it is sometimes cast that way both
by consumers and by outside observers of psychiatric
practice. Treatment that is involuntarily imposed, it is
generally agreed, is less ethically satisfactory than that
which is undertaken with consent. It is thus morally
incumbent on medical practitioners to seek from
patients their informed consent to treatment. For all
that he might consent, the patient who does not recog-
nize his symptoms and fails to accept the language and
presuppositions of medical psychiatry approaches the
moral status of an involuntary patient. Just as, we saw,
the patient has an incentive to describe her experience
through the master narrative, the ethical burden on
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clinicians requires them to privilege information
expressed in medical terms. This challenge has the form
of a clinician’s dilemma, one of many associated with
psychiatric practice. How it is to be resolved may
require concessions on the part of both the patient
(acknowledgement that all is not, or was not, well, for
example), and the practitioner (admission that the medi-
cal explanations and presuppositions most pertinent to
his or her practice may not be exhaustive, perhaps).
Recognition rights and group identity
Memoirs and first person accounts of psychiatric diag-
nosis and mental health care offer indications about
how experiences of mental disorder might be reframed
and redefined as part of efforts to acknowledge and
honor recognition rights and epistemic justice. The
source material, containing ways to construe such
experiences, and rich with implications for a more gen-
eral project of reconstructive cultural semantics, is there
for the taking. It seems we need only attend. Yet linger-
ing concerns remain, expressed in additional and more
recent work by Nancy Fraser where she has noted the
uncomfortable fit between recognition and identity poli-
tics [21]. These concerns involve both extra group and
intra group effects, we shall now see.
The politics of recognition aims to repair the mis-
recognition to which some groups have been subject. In
the Hegelian tradition from which these ideas derive,
individual identity is constructed as dialogical, through a
process of mutual recognition. A group cannot con-
struct its identity alone, this implies. Cultural identity
cannot be an “auto generated, auto description pre-
sented to others as an obiter dictum,” in Fraser’s words
(See [21] page 216.) That would engender another sort
of mis-recognition, and one that encouraged separatism
and group enclaves - both very real risks associated with
today’s consumer groups.
Our task of reconstructive cultural semantics will need
to engage more than the groups most immediately
affected. Of course consumers must be central partici-
pants, as the slogan ("nothing about us without us”)
implies. But this task of reconstruction requires consu-
mers be joined by allies from outside the group as well.
These new meanings cannot be forged through obiter
dictum, but through negotiation. This will involve doc-
tors and other mental health service providers, as well
as the rest of the community. And it will not be easy, as
we saw from the examples introduced above of con-
tested realities surrounding patient insight, and the
meanings attributed to symptoms.
It remains to be seen what compromises emerge
from such negotiation. But surely they will be required
of all participants. For example, acknowledgement that
mental disorder represents a state that all is not well,
or that has disadvantages for its sufferer - a concession
by the consumers - seem likely to have to be matched,
as we saw, by something like the admission that the
medical explanations and presuppositions are not
exhaustive, and that symptoms may be meaningful,
and affect outcomes, in more than one way. Arguably,
what has been recognized as a deflationary turn in
writing about psychotic symptoms augers the direction
these negotiations can be expected to take. The defla-
tionary turn includes increasing acknowledgement that
some forms of hallucination and delusion are benign;
that even patients lacking full insight may understand
their conditions in terms that can produce healing,
and that a continuum links clinical depression to more
everyday unhappiness, for example - each of which
deflates the pretensions of earlier-held medical psy-
chiatric orthodoxies (See [22].)
Dangers associated with solely intra group effects are
also noted by Fraser. Group-wrought definitions risk
imposing a revision no less constraining than the mis-
recognizing one it aims to replace. Fraser speaks of this
concern as a risk that identity will be reified. Stressing
the need for an authentic, self-affirming and self-gener-
ated collective identity, as she says, “puts moral pressure
on individual members to conform to a given group cul-
ture,” discouraging cultural dissidence, experimentation,
and cultural criticism. The overall effect is then to
impose a unitary, simplified group identity that denies
“the complexity of people’s lives, the multiplicity of their
identifications, and the cross-pulls of their various
affiliations” (See [21] page 215.) Some literature and
rhetoric from present day consumer movements, with
its simplified models of the relation between self and
symptoms and of psychiatric experience, arguably exhi-
bit the risk Fraser identifies here. If the task of recon-
structive cultural semantics is to avoid these limitations,
it must acknowledge and emphasize the heterogeneity of
the effects of, and of responses to, psychiatric diagnosis
and care.
Conclusion
The political category of recognition rights allows us to
see the extent and scope of mental health consumer
movements’ demands. Not only are social and economic
transformation called for, so are transformed meanings
and identities. My goal in this paper has been to identify
and applaud the first steps towards a reconstructive cul-
tural semantics that can be found in today’s mental ill-
ness memoirs, but also to draw attention to the
magnitude of the challenge involved - for consumers,
practitioners, and for the rest of us - as these new
meanings and realities are negotiated..
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